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FOREWORD 
During the past year some of the research effort of the 
Manpower Analysis Task has taken the form of a collaboration 
with the Regional Development Task in the General Research 
Area of IIASA. The focus of this collaborative activity has 
been an examination of regional economic policies in a number 
of countries. This paper, a part of that effort, focuses on 
the influence that political and economic factors have had in 
changing the implementation of regional economic policy in 
the Netherlands. The authors conclude that political factors 
played a negligible role, whereas the importance of economic 
factors reflected secular economic trends. The relative 
attention accorded to regional economic problems declined as 
the general health of the economy worsened. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to extend our understanding 
of government behavior in the area of regional economic policy 
for the case of the Netherlands. The study seeks to investigate 
systematically the role of economic and political factors in 
determining changes in the implementation of regional economic 
policy. It is concluded that political circumstances did not 
play any discernable role in regional policymaking, and that the 
influence of economic circumstances on regional policymaking has 
been dominate8 by a secular trend. A short-run cyclical influ- 
ence is found for qualitative changes in the policy package ; 
for quantitative changes in the amount of financial resources 
devoted to policymaking only the actual expenditures appear to 
possess a consistent cyclical component. 
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IMPLEI~IENTING REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES IN 
THE NETHERLANDS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In most developed countries governments have acquired an 
increasing influence on the distribution of economic welfare 
among the people during the past three decades. A typical 
example of this growth in government intervention is provided 
by regional policy, which has extended considerably in several 
European countries, especially during the sixties and seventies 
(compare Vanhove and Klaassen 1980; Yuill, Allen, and Hull 
1980; for more evidence on this matter). 
Although the extension of government influence on economic 
life has regularly been criticized by certain groups in society 
(notably liberal-conservative political parties and representa- 
tives of the business sector), it does not seem to have received 
wide criticism in the past. Only in the most recent years has 
this changed rather drastically. In several countries government 
is seriously under attack. The effectiveness of several of its 
activities is questioned, and some observers point to the 
government sector as one of the main contributors to rigidity 
in economics, which reduces the possibilities for a quick adap- 
tation to the structural changes that have become apparent 
during the seventies (see Van Duijn 1981, for a more extensive 
discussion) . 
It seems at first glance that the state of the national 
economy is a crucial factor in determining the role of the 
government in mixed economies. A long period with favorable 
growth rates for the national economy has provided the basis 
for a remarkable expansion of government intervention, while 
the economic problems during the second half of the seventies 
have created a more hostile attitude with respect to govern- 
ment. But if economic circumstances have indeed been so 
crucial in this process of growing government activity, one 
would be inclined to conclude that the shaping of this process 
has hardly been affected by clear political choices in the 
past (in De Jong 1981, a discussion of this opinion can be 
found). It is obvious that such a conclusion has very far 
reaching implications, e.g., concerning the functioning of 
parliamentary democracy in the developed world. 
This brief impression of a more general discussion of the 
role of government in economic life demonstrates how important 
it is to acquire good knowledge of the changes in government 
activities in the past and the possible relations with economic 
and political factors. This knowledge is indispensable for the 
discussion about the desired role of the government in the years 
to come. 
It is the purpose of this paper to extend our understanding 
of government behavior in one particular area, regional economic 
policy, for the special case of the Netherlands during the last 
three decades. Since a careful analysis of policy implementation 
requires very detailed information about various aspects of 
policymaking, such specific case studies seem to offer the best 
possibilities to obtain sound conclusions. 
Systematic analyzes of changes in the implementation of 
regional policies and the underlying forces are scarce. In 
several studies information on the changing contents of regional 
policy is given (compare, e.g. Armstrong and Taylor 1978), but 
mostly little or no systematical attention is given to the 
processes causing the changes. Another group of policy studies 
has preferred to investigate the impacts of the different policy 
instruments on the economic development of regions (compare 
Bartels, Nicol, and Van Duijn 1981, for a review of such studies). 
The present study intends to investigate systematically the role 
of economic and political forces in determining changes in the 
implementation of regional economic policy. For policy 
implementation we shall concentrate on the changing use of 
instruments during the past, and the financial resources that 
were devoted to the application of the instruments. First, 
however, we shall give a more theoretical discussion of the 
factors that could be relevant for an understanding of the 
dynamics of policy implementation. Then we proceed with the 
empirical part of this study. In Section 3 we consider the 
timing of significant changes in the policy package, and in 
Section 4 the financial resources devoted to policy implementa- 
tion will be analyzed. The results obtained from this empirical 
study are used in Section 5 to derive some interesting conclusions 
on the process of regional policymaking. 
2. FORCES INFLUENCING ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING 
Several forces can be indicated as possible determinants of 
the dynamic features of economic policymaking. If we first 
consider economic policymaking in general, then at least four 
important influences require attention. 
First, as has been stated already in the introduction, the 
economic conditions existing at the time of policy formulation 
and/or implementation may affect the contents and intensity of 
policy. These economic conditions may be considered as being 
composed of a long-run structural component and a short-run 
cyclical deviation from the structural trend (compare Van Duijn 
1979, 1981, for evidence on the importance of long-run trends in 
economics). As noted before, the structural trend may determine 
to a certain extent the possibilities and/or willingness for 
expansion or contraction of government activities. In periods of 
favorable growth rates an expansion of collective activities will 
be accepted easier than in times of slow growth, when expansion 
of the collective sector may require a contraction of the 
possibilities for private consumption. In addition to the 
structural trend, the existence of the business cycle causes 
fluctuations in economic circumstances. Economic policy based 
on Keynesian demand management will attempt to dampen the 
oscillations in such short-run fluctuations by means of an 
anticyclical economic policy. However, it has also been 
argued that attempts of Keynesian demand tuning have in fact 
frequently resulted into a procyclical role of the government, 
mainly because of the lack of sufficient flexibility in the 
policymaking process (compare, e.g., Dempster and Wildavsky 
1980). Hence, it is a matter of empirical investigation in 
what direction the cyclical fluctuations influence the intensity 
of economic policy. 
Second, we may mention the influence of general social 
norms prevailing in society. The evolution of society is 
generally characterized by the existence of a certain social 
consensus with respect to what is considered as social justice. 
Such a social consensus will determine to a certain extent the 
way in which a government reacts to the perception of certain 
social problems. In this paper we shall not discuss the poss- 
ible forces behind the changes of such social norms. (According 
to some opinions the dominant force would again be an economic 
one. ) 
Third, policymaking may be affected by the political factor, 
i.e., the distribution of political power in a democracy. If 
different political parties have notably different views on the 
ways of solving social problems and on the role of the collective 
sector in economic life, one would expect that changes in polit- 
lcal power have implications for economic policymaking. Such 
implications will be best identifiable if one has the possibility 
of distinguishing separate periods with different party composi- 
tions of the government. 
Fourth, it has been argued widely that a powerful bureaucracy 
may influence the preparation and implementation of policy 
considerably (compare, e.g., Dempster and Wildavsky 1980, and 
De Jong 1981). Possible consequences of this influence are: 
a built in tendency of a continuous increase in the budget 
(in Dempster and Wildavsky 1980, it is argued that the budget 
behavior of government agencies is in general incremental; they 
request in the budget preparation a proportional mark-up of the 
previous years appropriation) .and an increasing dissatisfaction 
about the working of the parliamentary democracy when apolitical 
technocracy plays a dominant role. 
It is obvious that insight into the working of each of 
these factors is of great importance. Such insight would help 
us to understand the role of government in the economic system 
(e.g., does government behave as an endogenous or an exogenous 
factor?) and the actual working of the political system. 
In the remainder of this paper we shall use information on 
regional economic policy in the Netherlands for the last three 
decades, to investigate part of these forces in a more detailed 
way. The characteristics of the data that will be used imply 
that we shall have to concentrate mainly on the influence of 
the economic and political factor. An analysis of the bureau- 
cratic factor would require a different type of data, e.g'., on 
the behavior of certain governmental agencies, while an investi- 
gation of the role of social norms would ask for information for 
a more extended period of time. With this restriction in mind, 
we now consider which typical influences of economic and 
political forces one might expect a  p r i o r i  on the properties of 
r e g i o n a l  policymaking. 
With respect to t h e  economic  f a c t o r  we are interested in 
knowing to what extent the pursuance of regional policy objectives 
has been affected by the state of the national economy. A first 
aspect of this relation is the impact of long-run economic 
development on regional policymaking. Is it true that a long 
period of sustained high levels of national economic growth has 
created a good basis for expansion of regional policymaking, and 
that a worsening of the national economic situation has put 
regional policy more into the background? This type of associa- 
tion would be consistent with a view expressed i n t e r  a Z i a  by 
Richardson: 
Regional development becomes a politically unacceptable 
diversion when the future of the national economy is in 
jeopardy. (Richardson 1978:264) 
For our postwar analysis on the structural development of the 
national economy can be briefly described as follows. The first 
period since World War I1 was characterized by a concentration 
of forces on the rebuilding of the national economy, which was 
among others characterized by relatively high levels of unemploy- 
ment especially in the beginning of the fifties (see Table 1, 
page 11, for information on unemployment figures). A very 
favorable economic situation prevailed during the sixties, with 
relatively low unemployment levels, for example. Structural 
problems in the national economy have come to the fore around 
1974 and have been especially revealed not only by the high rates 
of unemployment but also by the development of real national 
income which declined in 1975 for the first time in the last 
thirty years. Hence, in postwar economic development a structural 
component seems clearly to be present, so that we can analyze 
policy changes against this context. 
A second aspect of the relation between econmic circumstances 
and regional policymaking concerns the reaction of policymakers to 
the national business cycle. On several occasions the opinion has 
been expressed that the solution of regional problems attains less 
attention during periods of economic recession, when the concern 
of government would move more towards influencing the level rather 
than the geographic distribution of economic welfare. .As a 
consequence, problem areas would possibly be hurt relatively more 
by economic recession. However, one could equally well expect an 
opposite attitude of policymakers. National recessions have been 
characterized generally by an increase in interregional differences 
in the levels of unemployment (at least in the Netherlands), and 
have consequently put the regional problem more to the foreground. 
Combined with more political pressure from regions where the 
impacts of the recession are largest, one could expect an increas- 
ing activity of the government with respect to the solution of 
regional problems. 
For an empirical analysis of the influences of short-term 
cycles on policymaking we need an operational indicator that 
allows us to distinguish periods with a relatively good economic 
situation from periods with a worse economic performance. It is 
our impression that a popular indicator among policymakers has 
been the rate of unemployment. This is understandable since 
economic policymaking has been directed so much towards the goal 
of full employment. Below, we shall primarily use unemployment 
figures to judge the state of the national economy, but we also 
present some information derived from other more refined indica- 
tors of the cyclical performance of the national economy. From 
a more detailed study on postwar business cycles in the Netherlands 
performed by one of the authors (Van Duijn 1978), it can, however, 
be concluded that the unemployment variable represents a rather 
good and simple proxy for short-run economic fluctuations, at 
least up until approximately 1973/74. (Since then, the structural 
component in unemployment dominates.) 
With respect to t h e  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r  it is of interest to 
know if the regional problem receives more attention from certain 
political parties. This insight could provide a basis for the 
voting behavior of people living in the problem areas. A p r i o r ;  
we are inclined to expect that social-democratic parties will 
give a higher priority to the solution of regional problems than 
the more right-of-center or conservative parties like the 
Conservative-Liberals and the Christian-Democrats. (For example, 
in Logan 1978, this association is demonstrated for regional 
policymaking in Australia.) p his is because social-democrats 
generally give a high weight to the goal of obtaining a more 
equitable distribution of personal welfare (including its distri- 
bution over space), while especially Conservative-Liberals put 
more emphasis on the general level of economic welfare rather 
than on its distribution. In the Netherlands postwar politics is 
characterized by a permanent presence of the Christian-Democrats 
in government. During most of the period they had to form a 
coalition with other parties: either the Social-Democrats or the 
Conservative-Liberals. Hence, the political scence has changed 
several times, and this allows us to investigate the possible 
consequences for actual policymaking. 
Our analysis will be based on changes in regional economic 
policy, as far as being coordinated by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. This implies the following restrictions: 
- only regional policy of the central government has been 
considered 
- instruments not belonging to the package of regional 
policy, but in fact used in a regionally differentiated 
way and possibly contributing to the solution of 
regional problems have been excluded from the analysis 
- regional instruments coordinated by other agencies, and 
possibly affecting the economic conditions of regions, 
have also been excluded 
In order to assess the importance of the economic and 
political forces in regional policymaking, we shall first con- 
sider the timing of important qualitative changes in the policy 
package and then present a more quantitatively oriented analysis 
of the financial resources devoted to policy implementation 
over time. 
3. THE TIMING OF QUALITATIVE CHANGES IN THE POLICY PACKAGE* 
Before we start with a description of the timing of changes 
in the regional policy package, it may be informative to give a 
bit more background information on regional policy in the 
Netherlands. The dominant objective of regional economic policy 
seems not to have changed over time and- can be described as: 
diminishing discrepancies at spatial labor markets. To attain 
this objective, a policy strategy has been used with the follow- 
ing basic characteristics: 
1. The emphasis has been on influencing the location of 
the demand for labor, much more than that of labor 
supply 
*The information on regional economic policy is based on a 
monograph on the same subject written by the same authors, which 
is however only available in Dutch (see Bartels and Van Duijn 
798: j .  
The policy relied very much on instruments that may 
affect the location decisions of private actors in 
an i n d i r e c t  way. Investment incentives and infra- 
structural investments have dominated the policy 
package as long as regional policy exists. Only since 
the end of the sixties have some instruments with a 
more direct effect on the location of economic activ- 
ities come into use, but they have not been applied 
very intensively. (Examples are: the relocation of 
public offices, a system of investment permits for 
congested areas, and direct government investment 
through regional development companies in certain 
problem areas.) 
3. The policy package consisted almost completely of 
measures aiming at promoting the economic development 
of the backward regions. During the last decade some 
new r e s t r i c t i v e  instruments have been added for the 
congested areas, but these have hardly been used in 
practice. 
4. The selection of areas to be assisted has been based 
mainly on indicators for labor market discrepancies, 
especially the level of local or regional unempZoyment. 
(In the first years of regional policy, migration data 
served as an additional indicator. ) 
Aside from these general characteristics, the policy 
package has changed considerably over time. Regional economic 
policy started in 1951 with a special development,progrm for 
one area, where a considerable shortage of jobs resulted from 
the structural decline of its dominant economic activity. 
During the first years of regional policy the economic policy 
package contained in fact only two policy measures: infrastruc- 
tural investments and incentives for industrial investments. 
This situation did not change much up until approximately 
1966/67.  Since then several new measures have been introduced 
and the use of cld ones has been extended, and at the end of the 
seventies the policy package of the Ministry of Economic PAffairs 
contained: infrastructural investments, investment incentives 
for industrial firms and for certain service activities, interest 
subsidies and guarantees on loans, special investment incentives 
for areas with very high unemployment levels, relocation subsidies 
for activities that left the inner areas of the large cities, re- 
sources for four regional development funds, and special expendi- 
tures for the two largest problem areas - the North and South 
Limberg. 
Hence, t h e  p o l i c y  package has  been extended i n  a  very  r a d i c a l  
way. This  ex t ens ion  has  dominated policymaking: t h e r e  a r e  no 
examples of  an i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  new p o l i c y  measures accompanied 
by an a b o l i t i o n  of o l d  ones.  Only t h e  geog raph ica l  coverage o f  
p o l i c y  h a s  been widened and reduced,  and t h e  l e v e l  of  i n v e s t -  
ment i n c e n t i v e s  has  been lowered i n  a  few cases. Thi s  sugges t s  
t h a t  t h e r e  have e x i s t e d  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  p a s t  t h a t  favored  a  
s t r u c t u r a l  e x t e n s i o n  of  government i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  r e g i o n a l  
development. 
A more c a r e f u l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  of  t h e  p o l i c y  
package w i l l  be based on t h e  t iming  of  s i g n i f i c a n t  changes i n  
t h e  p o l i c y  measures. W e  made a  l i s t i n g  of  t h o s e  e v e n t s  t h a t  can 
be cons idered  a s  impor tan t  q u a l i t a t i v e  changes i n  p o l i c y  imple- 
menta t ion ,  i.e., t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  new measures and impor tan t  
changes i n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  o l d  ones  (geog raph ica l  coverage,  
l e v e l  of  i n c e n t i v e s ,  award c o n d i t i o n s ,  e tc ) .  I n  Table 1 t h i s  
in format ion  i s  presen t ed ,  t o g e t h e r  w i th  indicators f o r  s h o r t -  
run f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  t h e  s t a t e  of  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy. Th i s  
makes it p o s s i b l e  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  p o s s i b l e  r o l e  of  t h e  
economic f a c t o r  i n  r e g i o n a l  policymaking. 
F i r s t ,  it appears  t h a t  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  worsening of t h e  
n a t i o n a l  l a b o r  ,narket s i n c e  1973/74 h a s  n o t  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  a  
dec reas ing  a t t e n t i o n  f o r  t h e  r e g i o n a l  problem. On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  
t h e  second h a l f  of  t h e  s e v e n t i e s  ha s  been one o f  t h e  p e r i o d s  
w i th  a  most a c t i v e  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y ,  s o  f a r  a s  t h e  chanaes  i n  t h e  
p o l i c y  package a r e  concerned.  Another a c t i v e  p e r i o d  was t h e  
second h a l f  o f  t h e  s i x t i e s ,  when economic c o n d i t i o n s  w e r e  on t h e  
whole r a t h e r  f avo rab l e .  Hence, t h i s  i n fo rma t ion  does  n o t  r e v e a l  
a  c l e a r  l i n k a g e  between t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  development of  t h e  economy 
and t h e  a t t e n t i o n  g iven  t o  r e g i o n a l  po l i cy .  
For t h e  shor t - run  changes i n  economic c o n d i t i o n s  t h e  p i c t u r e  
i s  c l e a r e r ,  however. Most ex t ens ions  of  s t i m u l a t i o n  p o l i c i e s  
occur red  a t  t i m e s  of  a  h igh  n a t i o n a l  unemployment r a t e :  1951-53, 
1957, 1959, 1967/68, 1972, 1974/75, 1977/78, w i t h  t h e  on ly  
excep t ions  in:1964/65, and i n  1966. ( I n  . t h i s  yea r  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  
was extended t o  South Limburg, where t h e  c l o s u r e  o f  c o a l  mines 
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Table 1 . (continued) 
N a t i o n a l  
Recess ion  unemployment 
y e a r s  r a t e  Changes i n  r e g i o n a l  economic p o l i c y  
Crea t i on  o f  t h e  f i r s t  r e g i o n a l  development fund (NOM) wi th  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
of  d i r e c t  s t a t e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  
C rea t i on  o f  two new r e g i o n a l  development funds;  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  a c c e l e r a t e d  
d e p r e c i a t i o n ;  inves tment  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  expansion o f  c e r t a i n  s e r v i c e  a c t i v i -  
t ies;  e x t e n s i o n  o f  geog raph i ca l  coverage o f  p o l i c y ,  r e ach ing  t h e  maximal 
coverage e v e r ;  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  i n c e n t i v e s ;  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  a system o f  i nves t -  
ment l e v i e s  and p e n n i t s  f o r  p a r t  o f  t h e  coun t ry  (1/10/1975) 
I 
-L 
Adjournment o f  t h e  inves tment  l e v i e s  (9/6/1976) w I 
F u r t h e r  e x t e n s i o n s  of  inves tment  i n c e n t i v e s ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s  h ighe r  l e v e l s  
i n  s p e c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  a r e a s ;  o f f i c a l  d e c i s i o n  t o  r e l a x  t h e  r e l o c a t i o n  o f  
p u b l i c  o f f i c e s  
I n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a new scheme of inves tment  i n c e n t i v e s  (18/7/1978), t oge the r  
w i th  r e i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  inves tment  l e v i e s  f o r  t h e  conges ted  a r e a s  
The in format ion  on r e c e s s i o n  y e a r s  is  based on Van Dui jn  (1978) where s e v e r a l  i n d i c a t o r s  have been used t o  i d e n t i f y  
t h e  phases  o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s  cyc l e s .  
The unemployment r a t e  i s  t h e  l a b o r  r e s e r v e  a s  a  pe r cen t age  o f  t h e  dependent  l a b o r  f o r c e  ( source :  C e n t r a l  P lann ing  
Bureau, C e n t r a l  Economic P l an t  s e v e r a l  y e a r s ) .  
The changes i n  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  have been t aken  from Bartels and Van Dui jn  (1981).  
caused structural employment problems.) Restrictions on stimu- 
lation policies have been imposed rarely, but if they occurred 
then it was at times of a favorable national economic situation 
(e.g., the beginning of 1957 and 1971). On the other hand, 
restrictive policies (including the relocation of public offices) 
have been relaxed in times of a high national unemployment rate 
(especially since 1976: the renewed introduction of investment 
levies in 1978 was more than offset by a new scheme of investment 
incentives, also applicable in the congested areas). From these 
observations it can be concluded that attention for the problems 
of backward regions increased in times of less favorable national 
economic. conditions, possibly because of a relative worsening of 
the situation in such regions in times of national economic 
recession. 
The other possible determinant of policy changes to be 
investigated here is the political factor. In Table 2 we have 
presented information on the parties represented in the govern- 
ment in different time periods. This information can be compared 
with that in Table 1. The start with regional economic policy 
was made under coalitions including the Social-Denocrats (SD), 
the Christian-Democrats (CD), and the Conservative-Liberals (CL). 
Changes in the policy package that were meant to favor the back- 
ward regions more have been introduced under CD/SD and under 
CD/CL coalitions with certainly not a more intensive activity 
under SD presence in the coalitions. Policy changes favoring 
instead the core areas (such as relaxation of restrictive measures) 
also occurred under both types of coalitions. For example, in 
1976 the adjournment of investment levies was decided upon by a 
CD/SD cabinet and in 1977 a CD/CL government decided officially 
to relzx the relocation of public offices (although this relax- 
ation started in practice under the previous CD/SD coalition). 
Thus the timing of policy changes did not possess a clear associ- 
ation with the changes in the political conditions. Now it 
could be possible that a clearer relationship existed with 
specific characteristics of policy measures used. But also this 
hypothesis finds no support in this information. Typical 
"leftist" instruments like the creation of regional development 
funds and the use of investment permits and levies in congested 
Table 2. Party composition of coalitions. 
a P e r i o d  C o m p o s i t i o n  
SD , CD , CL , others 
SD, CD, CL, others 
SD, at others 
SD, CD 
CD 
CD, CL 
CD, CL  
SD, CD 
CD 
CD, CL 
CD, CL, others 
SD, CD, others 
CD, C L  
%D = S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t s  (PvdA)  
CD = C h r i s t i a n - D e m o c r a t s  (KvP,  AR, CHU; i n  recent years CDA) 
CL = C o n s e r v a t i v e - L i b e r a l s  (WD) 
In  s o m e  cases a s m a l l  n u m b e r  of participants f r o m  other part ies w a s  included 
i n  t h e  government, w h i c h  has been i n d i c a t e d  by "others". 
Source: T h e  information f o r  t h i s  table stems m a i n l y  f r o m  V a n  den B e r g h i a n d  
V i s  ( 1 9 7 7 )  . 
areas have indeed been introduced by CD/SD coalitions. But the 
CD/SD government also took the decision not to use the invest- 
ment restrictions; and a CD/CL coalition reintroduced the levies 
again. The first use of labor subsidies, another "leftist" 
instrument, was a CD/CL initiative as well. From all this 
evidence we can conclude that the political factor has had no 
discernable influence on the actual contents of regional economic 
policy in the past. 
4. FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
In this section we.shall use quantitative information to 
investigate the hypotheses formulated before. We analyzed all 
the budgets of the Ministry of Economic Affair~~since 1949 to 
obtain an indication of the financial resources devoted to the 
implementation of regional economic policy. Two types of data 
could be used for this purpose, First, the intended expendi- 
tures as given in the yearly budgets that are submitted for 
parliamentary approval give the best indication of the inten- 
tions of policymakers. Second, the r e a l  expenditures that can 
be estimated afterwards indicate to a certain extent the efforts 
made by the administration to realize its intentions. But in 
general these real expenditures are less easily interpretable, 
since they are affected by several factors. They depend on the 
use that is made of instruments with a free participation of 
private decisionmakers and on the time lags in the execution of 
certain long-run investment programs (egg., infrastructural 
investments). So it is clear that intended and real expenditures 
may differ considerably over time and that also the interpreta- 
tion of changes in the size of these resources will frequently 
be different. Below, we shall use both types of data, taking 
into account the implications for the interpretation, 
The basic information for the rest of the analysis is con- 
tained in Appendix A, It gives figures for the intended 'and 
real expenditures for regional economic policy expressed in 
constant prices (calcuated from more detailed data, so that we 
could use three different prices deflators according to the 
type of expenditures) and for the share of such expenditures in 
t h e  t o t a l  economic budget. S ince  t h e  series show sometimes a 
r a t h e r  e r r a t i c  behavior ,  w e  a l s o  c a l c u l a t e d  smoothed s e r i e s  of 
5-year moving averages ,  t h a t  can be found i n  Appendix B. These 
s e r i e s  show t h e  long-term t r e n d s  i n  t h e  s e r i e s  much b e t t e r .  
( In  f a c t ,  t h e  use  of a 5-year moving average i m p l i e s  t h a t  s h o r t -  
run c y c l i c a l  components have been removed from t h e  d a t a ,  because 
t h e  average  l eng th  o f  postwar bus iness  c y c l e s  was somewhat l e s s  
than 5 yea r s ;  see Van Duijn 1978.) 
I f  w e  look a t  t h e  f i g u r e s  i n  Appendices A and B we f i r s t  
n o t i c e  t h e  tremendous i n c r e a s e  i n  a b s o l u t e  expend i tu re s  f o r  
r e g i o n a l  economic po l i cy .  Intended expendi tures  r o s e  from an 
average of 8 m i l l i o n  g u i l d e r s  i n  t h e  pe r iod  1951/55, t o  an 
average of  230 m i l l i o n  i n  t h e  per iod  1975/79. ( I n  r e a l i t y  t h e  
i n c r e a s e  might have been a b i t  sma l l e r ,  s i n c e  i n  t h e  f i f t i e s  
c e r t a i n  expend i tu re s  on i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  d i d  l a te r  appear  on 
t h e  economic budget were r e g i s t e r e d  elsewhere.  But t h e  s i z e  of  
t h e s e  amounts has  been such t h a t  they do n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  i n t e r -  
p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  d a t a  s i g n i f i c a n t l y . )  The r e a l i z e d  expendi tures  
rose  from an average of  5 m i l l i o n  i n  1951/55 t o  254 m i l l i o n  i n  
1975/79. The f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  s h a r e  of r e g i o n a l  expend i tu re s  i n  
t h e  t o t a l  budget r e v e a l  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  a t t e n t i o n  devoted t o  
r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  a l s o  inc reased  cons iderab ly .  I n  t h e  f i f t i e s  
r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  d i d  n o t  r e c e i v e  much a t t e n t i o n .  Th i s  changed a t  
t h e  beginning of  t h e  s i x t i e s  and s i n c e  1965 t h e  s h a r e  o f  in tended  
expendi tures  f l u c t u a t e d  between 13% and 24% ( f o r  t h e  r e a l i z e d  
expendi tures :  between 8% and 22$) ,  wi th  a peak i n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  
of t h e  s e v e n t i e s .  
Is t h e r e  any a s s o c i a t i o n  between t h e s e  f i g u r e s  and t h e  eco- 
nomic and p o l i t i c a l  c i rcumstances? W e  s t a r t  w i th  an a n a l y s i s  
of  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r .  I n  Table 3 w e  have d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
pe r iods  wi th  a d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  "co lor" ,  i . e . ,  accord ing  t o  
t h e  presence  of Social-Democrats i n  t h e  r u l i n g  c o a l i t i o n .  Then 
w e  i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  expend i tu re s  t h a t  could be in f luenced  by t h e  
d i f f e r e n t  c o a l i t i o n s ;  e .g . ,  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  r u l i n g  a t  t h e  end of  
1966 has in f luenced  t h e  in tended  expend i tu re s  f o r  1967 and t h e  
r e a l  expendi tures  f o r  1966. I n  t h i s  way average numbers w e r e  
c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  a l l  pe r iods .  Of s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  a r e  t h e  s h a r e  
Table 3 .  Regional  expend i tu re s  under d i f f e r e n t  c o a l i t i o n s .  
Average of  
in tended  r e a l  s h a r e  s h a r e  
expen- expen- o  f o f  
P a r t i c i -  d i t u r e s  d i t u r e s  in tended  r e a l  
p a t i o n  ( c o n s t a t  ( cons t an t  expendi- expendi- 
Per iod  of SD p r i c e s )  p r i c e s )  tures ( % )  t u r e s  ( % )  
The c a l c u l a t i o n s  have been based on t h e  d a t a  i n  Appendix A and i n  Table 2. 
For more in format ion  see  t h e  t e x t .  
f i g u r e s ,  s i n c e  they  i n d i c a t e  t h e  r e l a t i v e  a t t e n t i o n  devoted t o  
r e g i o n a l  po l i cy .  I f  w e  would c a l c u l a t e  t h e  average  s h a r e  of  
r e g i o n a l  expend i tu re s  f o r  SD and non-SD c o a l i t i o n s  ove r  t h e  
whole p e r i o d ,  it would be h ighe r  under t h e  non-SDgavernments 
because of  t h e  low v a l u e s  i n  t h e  f i f t i e s .  Concent ra t ing  on t h e  
s i x t i e s  and s e v e n t i e s ,  t h e  s c o r e  of  t h e  in tended  expend i tu re s  
s h a r e  i s  q u i t e  good under SD c o a l i t i o n s .  But t h e  dramat ic  
i n c r e a s e  a t  t h e  beginning of  t h e  s i x t i e s  occur red  under a  
government w i thou t  SD1s; t h e  maximal s h a r e  was reached i n  1967 /72  
under governments w i thou t  SD's; and t h e  s h a r e  s t a r t e d  d e c l i n i n g  
i n  1973 /76  under a  c o a l i t i o n  i n c l u d i n g  SD1s. Hence, it cannot  
be  concluded t h a t  t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  of SD1s f a v o r  t h e  problem a r e a s  
most. Besides ,  t h e  f i g u r e s  of t h e  r e a l  expend i tu re s  r e v e a l  an 
i n t e r e s t i n g  tendency: t hey  seem t o  be h ighe r  t han  t h e  i n t ended  
ones under  non-SD governments b u t  lower t han  t h e  in tended  ones  
under SD governments! Using t h e  r e a l i z e d  expend i tu re s  a s  an 
i n d i c a t o r , t h e  problem a r e a s  have d e f i n i t e l y  been se rved  b e t t e r  
by the non-SD governments than by coalitions including SD 
participants1 
Now we turn to a discussion of the possible impacts of 
economic circumstances on the financial resources reserved for 
regional policymaking. As we observed before the national 
economy performed relatively well in the sixties and the begin- 
ning of the seventies, whereas serious structurar problems have 
arisen sir.ce approximately 1974. From our-data in Appendix A 
and Appendix B, it can be learned that the "good" years for the 
national economy have also been the good years for regional 
policy: the moving-average series for intended expenditures 
increased continuously from 1958 to 1973/75, and for real 
expenditures from 1958 to 1972. Afterwards; both series first 
declined, but in the most recent years again an increase can be 
noted to a value exceeding all previous values. If we further 
know that during the second half of the seventies several non- 
regional instruments have been applied with a regional differen- 
tiation, then we cannot conclude that the structural problems of 
the national economy did result into less financial resources 
for regional policymaking. But the continuous growth during the 
Itgood" years has clearly been ended. 
For the figures on the shares the picture looks different, 
however. From these it is observed that the regional problems 
received relatively an increasing attention during the sixties 
and beginning of the seventies, but since approximately 1971/72 
this trend has been reversed: national problems seem to have 
crowded out the regional problems in actual policymaking. 
In order to detect a possible association with short-run 
economic fluctuations we analyzed our data in two different ways. 
First, we used the original data and calculated averages for 
subsequent periods with relatively high and low national unemploy- 
ment rates (using 2% as a critical value and associating the 
intended expenditures again with the unemployment situation at the 
time the budget was prepared, i.e., the year before). See Table 4 
for the results. It appears that for intended expenditures the 
average amount has always been higher during periods of high 
Table  4 .  Regional  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  
t h e  n a t i o n a l  l a b o r  market .  
- -- 
Average  o f  
P e r i o d ,  and  c h a r a c -  i n t e n d e d  r e a l  s h a r e  o f  s h a r e  
t e r i z a t i o n  o f  e x p e n d i t u r e s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n t e n d e d  o f  real  
n a t i o n a l  unemploy- ( c o n s t a n t  ( c o n s t a n t  e x p e n d i -  e x p e n d i -  
n e n t  s i t u a t i o n  prices) p r i c e s )  t u r e s  ( % )  t u r e s  ( % )  
1949-54 : h i g h  7.2 3 - 1  1 .3  0.4 
1955-57 : low 4.7 6.9 1.2 1.4 
1958-59 : h i g h  27.8 2.2 7.3 0.6 
1960-66 : low 91.0 58.0 15.8 8.8 
1967-68 : h i g h  193,7  148,2 17 .1  15.5 
1969-71 : l ow 196.0 238.0 18.0 20.0 
1972- : h i g h  245.8 236.3 17 .2  15.5 
-- - -~ ~ 
The c a l c u l a t i o n  h a s  been  b a s e d  on  t h e  d a t a  i n  T a b l e  1 a n d  Appendix A. 
High unemployment m e a n s  a rate > 2%,  and  low unemployment a rate < 2%. 
n a t i o n a l  unemployment t h a n  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  p e r i o d  w i t h  low 
unemployment. But on  t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h i s  a l s o  h o l d s  t r u e  f o r  
p e r i o d s  o f  low unemployment compared w i t h  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  p e r i o d  
o f  h i g h  unemployment! For  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  a c t u a l l y  used  t h e  
p i c t u r e  l o o k s  a  l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n t .  During t h e  f i f t i e s  and 
s e v e n t i e s  t h e s e  r e s o u r c e s  d e c l i n e d  on t h e  a v e r a g e  i n  p e r i o d s  o f  
h i g h  unemployment. T h i s  c a n  be  e x p l a i n e d  by a less i n t e n s i v e  
u s e  o f  c e r t a i n  i n c e n t i v e s  i n  t i m e s  o f  economic s t a g n a t i o n .  But 
i n  t h e  s i x t i e s  t h i s  a s s o c i a t i o n  d i d  n o t  e x i s t .  For  t h e  s h a r e  
f i g u r e s  a  s i m i l a r  p i c t u r e  emerges. I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  see 
t h a t  t h e  s h a r e  o f  a c t u a l  r e g i o n a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  h a s  d e c r e a s e d  
d u r i n g  two p e r i o d s  o f  h i g h  unemployment, which i m p l i e s  t h a t  the  
a c t u a l  u s e  o f  r e g i o n a l  i n c e n t i v e s  h a s  a  h i g h e r  c y c l i c a l  s e n s i -  
t i v i t y  t h a n  t h e  a c t u a l  u s e  o f  n o n r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s .  
From t h e s e  remarks it c a n  b e  concluded t h a t  t h e  s i z e  o f  r e g i o n a l  
p o l i c y  expend i tu re s ,  a s  f a r  a s  a f f e c t e d  by policymakers ( i . e . ,  
t h e  in tended  expend i tu re s  ) has  no t  been r e l a t e d  t o  sho r t - run  
changes i n  t h e  s t a t e  of  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy. 
S i n c e  t h e  d a t a  i n  Table 4 aga in  sugges t  t h e  dominance of  a  
long-term s t r u c t u r a l  t r e n d ,  a  second way o f  ana lyz ing  t h e  s h o r t -  
run  component i s  c a l c u l a t i o n  of  a  t r e n d - f r e e  series. Thi s  has  
been done by c a l c u l a t i o n  of  t h e  d e v i a t i o n s  from t h e  f i v e  yea r  
moving averages  series ( t h o s e  d e v i a t i o n s  can be cons idered  a s  
being composed of  shor t - run  changes and e r r a t i c  components 
ma in ly ) .  I f  w e  look a t  t h e  s i g n  o f  t h e s e  d e v i a t i o n s  (see 
Appendix B) w e  can make t h e  fol lowing obse rva t ions :  
- of t h e  18 y e a r s  w i th  h igh  unemployment, t h e  i n t ended  
expend i tu re s  exceeded i n  10 c a s e s  t h e  s e c u l a r  t r e n d ,  and 
t h e  r e a l  expend i tu re s  i n  7  cases; 
- of  t h e  13 y e a r s  w i th  low unemployment, t h e  i n t ended  
expend i tu re s  exceeded i n  4 c a s e s  t h e  s e c u l a r  t r e n d ,  and 
t h e  r e a l  expend i tu re s  i n  8  ca ses .  
This  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  in tended  expend i tu re s  have t h e  tendency 
t o  be a n t i c y c l i c a l  ( i .e . ,  dimin ish ing  t h e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  aggre- 
g a t e  demand) d u r i n g  t h e  expansion phase and c y c l i c a l  n e u t r a l  
du r ing  t h e  dep res s ion ,  and t h a t  t h e  real expend i tu re s  are r a t h e r  
p r o c y c l i c a l  ( i .e . ,  r e i n f o r c i n g  t h e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  agg rega t e  
demand), bo th  du r ing  dep res s ions  and expansions .  I t  can be  noted 
t h a t  t h i s  g e n e r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  does  n o t  change i f  w e  d e l e t e  t h e  
pe r iod  s i n c e  1973 (because of t h e  p o s s i b l e  dominance of  s t r u c t u r a l  
problems s i n c e  t h e n )  from t h e  d a t a .  
The t r e n d  d e v i a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  s h a r e  v a r i a b l e s  s u c ~ g e s t  t h a t  t h e  
r e l a t i v e  a t t e n t i o n  f o r  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y ,  a s  measured bo th  by 
in t ended  and r e a l  expend i tu re s ,  s t a y s  i n  h igh  unemployment y e a r s  
behind t h e  l e v e l  t h a t  i s  accounted f o r  by t h e  s e c u l a r  t r e n d .  
CONCLUSIONS 
The s p e c i f i c  f i n d i n g s  i n  t h e  foregoing  s e c t i o n s  a l l ow us  t o  
draw some i n t e r e s t i n g ,  more g e n e r a l  conc lus ions  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
t h e  r o l e  of  economic and p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  i n  r e g i o n a l  po l icy-  
making i n  t h e  Nether lands .  
The discussion of changes in political circumstances, and in 
qualitative and quantitative policy implementation, reveals that 
these political circumstances did not play any discernable role 
in regional policymaking. The expected association between 
social democratic representation in the government and more 
concern with regional problems could not be proved. The explan- 
ation for this finding could be the fact that a constant factor 
in Dutch politics since World War I1 has been the continuous 
presence and dominance of Christian-Democrats in all coalitions. 
Therefore, it is not unusual to observe that certain policy- 
measures are prepared by one coalition and implemented by another 
with a completely different party representation. It is obvious 
that this continuity in policymaking makes it difficult or 
impossible for voters to recognize the party ideology in the 
actual government behavior. Such recognition is perhaps easier 
in political systems, with two dominating large parties, like in 
Great Britain and West Germany. 
The influence of economic circumstances on regional policy- 
making has been dominated by a secular trend. The prosperity of 
the sixties has allowed both absolute and relative expenditures 
for the regions to expand considerably. In the past decade, the 
emergence of structural problems in the national labor market 
has caused a decline in the relative attention given to regional 
problems. The absolute amounts of'financial resources, however, 
have still increased, but there are now signs that these have 
passed their peak and will also decline in the years to come 
(following perhaps the trend in Great Britain, where government 
spending on regional policy decreased from such levels as 612 
million pounds sterling in 1969/70 and 611 million in 1975/76 to 
322 million in 1979/80, all measured in real terms; see CEPG 1980). 
Compared with this secular economic trend, a short-run cyclical 
influence is most convincing for the qualitative changes in the 
policy package, which were concentrated mainly in years with high 
unemployment. For the financial resources, however, only the 
actual expenditures showed a consistent cyclical component, suppor- 
ting the possibility of a procyclical working of regional policy 
expenditures. 
In  t h e  long run  governments'behavior wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  backward 
reg ions  seems t o  be p r o c y c l i c a l ,  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
a s s i s t a n c e  mostly i n  t i m e s  when t h e  r eg ions  a r e  less i n  need f o r  
it. This  obse rva t ion  suppor ts  t h e  view t h a t  t h e  r e g i o n a l  problem 
w i l l  n o t  e a s i l y  d isappear  from t h e  p o l i t i c a l  scene,  con t ra ry  t o  
t h e  expec ta t ion  a t  t h e  t i m e  r eg iona l  economic p o l i c y  s t a r t e d .  
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APPENDIX A: INTENDED AND REAL EXPENDITURES FOR REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC POLICY (absolute and relative figures) 
Year 
In tended  R e a l  Share  Share  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n t e n d e d  r e a l  
( c o n s t a n t  ( c o n s t a n t  expendi-  expendi-  
p r i c e s )  p r i c e s )  t u r e s  ( % )  t u r e s  ( % )  
0.6 1.1 0.1 0.1 
3.7 1.2 0.6 0.1 
10.7 2.1 2.2 0.3 
2.3 0.4 0.5 0 .1  
9.8 1.6 1.6 0.2 
9.3 11.9 1.7 1.8 
7.5 8.5 1 .3  1.4 
6 .1  7.1 1.1 1.1 
4.0 5.1 1.3 1 .8  
4.0 1.5 1.2 0.5 
3.8 3.0 1.2 0.8 
51.8 10.2 13.5 2.8 
113.1 45.1 22.9 10.6 
125.0 38.6 24.0 8.0 
35.9 65.2 8.3 10 .1  
27.0 95.9 6.1 13.0 
82.2 79.7 13.5 8.4 
125.7 71.4 18.1 8.8 
128.0 100.3 17.9 13.1  
197.1 196.0 18.7 17.8 
190.3 213.2 15.4 19.5 
182.4 204.9 17.6 18.3 
207.7 296.0 19,3  22.2 
197.8 240.0 17.0 20.2 
318.1 211.2 24,3 18.9 
252.5 167.4 22.5 14.3 
209.1 165.0 17.4 11.9 
187.9 167.5 16.2 11.8 
249.7 331.5 15.2 16.6 
216.9 337.8 12.8 17.2 
286.3 270.1 14.8 12.9 
16.8 
15-2 
The f i g u r e s  on a b s o l u t e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  a r e  i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  g u i l d e r s .  In tended  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  a r e  t h e  amounts o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  a s  t h e s e  appear  on t h e  
y e a r l y  budge t s ;  r e a l i z e d  e x p e n d i t u r e s  a r e  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  means which have 
a c t u a l l y  been used. Both s e r i e s  have been t rans formed  i n t o  c o n s t a n t  p r i c e s ,  
u s i n g  d i f f e r e n t  d e f l a t o r s  w i t h  b a s e  1975 f o r  d i f f e r e n t  i tems.  S i n c e  t h e  
d e f l a t o r s  were n o t  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  and s i n c e  t h e  r e a l  expendi-  
t u r e s  f o r  t h e s e  y e a r s  a r e  n o t  y e t  known, n o t  a l l  t h e  s e r i e s  c o u l d  be 
complete. The s h a r e  f i g u r e s  e x p r e s s  t h e  r e g i o n a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  c u r r e n t  
p r i c e s  as a p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  economic budget  i n  c u r r e n t  p r i c e s .  
D e t a i l s  on t h e  d i f f e r e n t  i t e m s  i n c l u d e d  can be  found i n  B a r t e l s  and Van 
Dui jn  (1981) .  
APPENDIX B: FIVE-YEAR MOVING AVERAGES OF EXPENDITURES FOR 
REGIONAL ECONOP'IIC POLICY (and signs of deviations 
from these series). 
Year 
Intended 
expendi tures  
(cons tant  
p r i c e s )  
Real Share 
expendi tures  intended 
(cons tant  expendi- 
p r i c e s )  t u r e s  ( % )  
Share 
r e a l  
expendi- 
t u r e s  ( % )  
a 0.2 
0.2b ( - )  
0.2 (+) 
0.5 (-1 
0.8 (-1 
0.9 (+) 
1.3 ( + I  
1.3 (-1 
1.1 (+) 
1.4 (-1 
3.3 (-1 
4.5 (-1 
6.5 ( + I  
8.9 ( -1 
10.0 ( + I  
9.7 (+) 
10.7 ( -1  
12.2 ( - 1  
13.5 ( -1 
15.5 (+) 
18.2 (+) 
19.6 ( - 1  
19.8 (+) 
18.8 (+) 
17.5 (-1 
15.4 (-1 
14.7 ( -1 
14.4 ( -1 
14.1b (+) 
14.6 (+) 
1 5 . 6 ~  (-) 
See Appendix A f o r  more information. 
The absolu te  f i g u r e s  a r e  aga in  i n  m i l l i o n s  o f g u i l d e r s .  
Between the  b racke t s  i s  t h e  s i g n  of t h e  dev ia t ion  of  the  o r i g i n a l  f i g u r e  
from the  5-year moving agerage given. 
a 3-year average 
b 4-year average 
